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6 Foreseeable and unforeseeable defects after
the transfer of immovable property
Clementine Breedveld-de Voogd
The taps started dripping, the pipes started leaking, the roof tiles started
breaking, and green mould started appearing on the walls.1
1 THE CONFORMITY REQUIREMENT AND THE MANIFESTATION OF HIDDEN
DEFECTS
Anyone who has ever bought a house knows one thing for sure: sooner or
later, they will be faced with repairs and major and minor defects, and have
to make more or less necessary alterations to bring the house into line with
modern life.2 The battle against the elements, including fire and water, is in
the buyer’s hands from the time of delivery (article 7:10(1) of the Dutch Civil
Code, hereinafter ‘DCC’),3 and that is why the date of delivery is the point
at which it is necessary to decide whether the seller has sold the buyer a prop-
erty which conforms to the contract.4 The seller is liable for defects which
existed before the delivery and which the buyer did not need to expect at that
point. It is generally accepted, on the basis of case law established in the lower
Clementine Breedveld-de Voogd is professor of private law, Leiden University.
1 Isabel Allende, The House of the Spirits (English translation by Magda Bogin, original title:
La casa de los espiritus), Jonathan Cape, 1982.
2 The conformity requirement of article 7:17 DCC, the provisions regarding the time of the
transfer of risk (article 7:10 DCC) and the obligation to notify of article 7:23 DCC apply
to the sale of both movable property and immovable property. This article was written
from the perspective of the sale of immovable property and does not deal with the rules
for consumer sales, in view of the fact that the sale of immovable property is by definition
not deemed to be a ‘consumer sale’ (article 7:5(1) DCC), even if the property was sold to
a consumer by a professional seller.
3 The time of delivery is the point at which the buyer is given possession of the property
(article 7:9(2) DCC). Opinions differ on the question when this is the case for immovable
property. According to Huijgen, this is prior to the transfer, viz. when the keys are handed
over, which is usually done when the deed of transfer of title is signed (W.G. Huijgen, Koop
en verkoop van onroerende zaken (Studiepockets Privaatrecht, no. 58), 3rd edition, Deventer:
Kluwer 2008, no. 21), but according to Reehuis this point usually coincides with the registra-
tion of the deed of transfer of title in the public registers (Pitlo/Reehuis Heisterkamp,
Goederenrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, no. 205).
4 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en Ruil, 2007, no. 332.
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courts,5 that when buying an existing property, not every imperfectionmeans
that the house fails to conform to the contract. Thus, to a certain extent, a buyer
will have to take account of some maintenance or arrears that will need to
be performed immediately, even if the need for them was not immediately
visible when the contract of sale was signed.6 A buyer who fails to perform
such maintenance and who lets minor repairs become major arrears cannot
hold the seller responsible for this. This does not, however, alter the fact that
after the sale, it may be possible to stumble on defects which could not really
be considered the kind of problems a buyer could be expected to accept and
which therefore fall outside the scope of the conformity requirements of article
7:17 DCC. If such defects manifest themselves, the buyer can exercise against
the seller the rights and powers the law confers on him in the event that an
obligation under the contract has not been performed (article 7:22(4) DCC): he
may, for example, demand repair (article 7:21(1)(b) DCC), set aside the contract
of sale in whole or in part (article 6:265 DCC) or claim compensation (article
6:74 DCC). Confirmation that such a defect exists could also, for example, lead
to the conclusion that the buyer has been led astray upon the formation of
the contract of sale (error), and this offers him the possibility to annul the
contract (article 6:257 DCC).
By definition, a ‘conformity defect’ is one which the buyer should not have
been required to expect at the time of the delivery. However, does this also
mean that the buyer is justified in waiting to see whether such a defect
manifests itself following delivery? And is it then not too late to go back to
the seller with a claim on account of that defect? Article 7:23(1) DCC (which
can be classified as a lex specialis of article 6:89 DCC) makes it clear that, in legal
terms as well, a buyer cannot remain passive following delivery and must
give the seller notification of a defect ‘within a reasonable period after having
discovered or having reasonably been able to discover’ that defect. A buyer
who fails to comply with this obligation to notify the seller, loses all rights
under the claim that the purchased thing does not conform to the contract.
According to case law of the Dutch Supreme Court, this sanction not only
applies to claims concerning defects in purchased things based on nonconform-
ity to the contract, but also to claims for annulment of the contract on the
grounds of error and to claims arising from an unlawful act.7 The period
5 District Court of Arnhem 4 December 1997, NJkort 1998, 22 and District Court of Utrecht
17 December 1997, NJkort 1998, 26.
6 W.G. Huijgen, Koop en verkoop van onroerende zaken (Studiepockets Privaatrecht, no. 58),
3rd edition, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, no. 22a; Castermans &Krans 2009 (Text and Comment-
ary on the Dutch Civil Code), article 7:17 DCC, note 2; Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en Ruil, 2007,
no. 346d.
7 Dutch Supreme Court 29 June 2007, NJ 2008, 606, with commentary from Jac. Hijma and
Dutch Supreme Court 21 April 2006,NJ 2006, 272 (Inno v Sluis). For criticism of the applica-
tion of article 7:23 DCC in case of error, see Jac. Hijma, ‘Koop en ruil’, WPNR 5982 (1990),
pp. 738-739.
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within which the buyer was permitted to give notification of any defect in
purchased things is deemed an expiry period.8 This is then followed by a
period of limitation, which can be described as fairly brief compared with the
general periods of limitation provided for in Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code.
Claims and grounds for defence which are based on nonconformity of the
purchased thing expire two years after the buyer gave the seller notification
in compliance with the obligation to do so (article 7:17(2) DCC).
The expiry period of article 7:23 DCC was designed to protect a seller
against late notifications which are then difficult to dispute.9 The principal
criticism of this ratio legis in legal literature is that article 7:23 DCC offers
insufficient justification for the far-reaching sanction which it imposes on the
buyer, viz. the expiry of all his rights on the grounds of nonconformity.10
Tamboer therefore argues in favour of making finer distinctions as to the
consequences of overdue notifications. In view of the fact that articles 6:89
and 7:23 DCC are elaborations of the doctrine of the forfeiture of rights and
are therefore based on the restrictive effect of the key principle of reasonable-
ness and fairness underDutch law (redelijkheid en billijkheid), Tamboer believes
that article 7:23 DCC should also be elaborated in that light. She argues, for
example, that, although forfeiture of the right to claim the setting aside of an
entire contract is not unfair, it should remain possible to claim partial repay-
ment of the purchase price. She also believes that finer distinctions should
be possible as regards which party should be responsible for providing evid-
ence of the allegations and which party has the burden of proof.11
The applicability of the principles of reasonableness and fairness at the
end of the route, i.e. to claims that can be filed in the event of a breach of
contract, is an opportunity to avoid the unfair outcome of the obligation to
notify. The Dutch Supreme Court, however, seems to have opted for a different
approach: it has placed the question whether the buyer has notified the seller
in time in the ‘key context’ of contractual good faith and has allocated an
important role to the seller’s obligation to provide the buyer with information
and the buyer’s obligation to investigate, as is customary in the formation of
a contract.
8 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en ruil, 2007, no. 543; regarding the question of whether this is an
expiry period under the rules of public order, see R.P.J.L. Tjittes, ‘De klacht- en onderzoeks-
plicht bij ondeugdelijke prestaties’, RMThemis 2007, p. 16.
9 TM, Parliamentary history, Parl. Gesch. InvW. Boek 7, p. 146.
10 J.G.H.Meijerink, ‘De klachtplicht in Europees perspectief’,NTBR 2010, para. 3; S. Tamboer,
‘De klachtplicht van de koper in het Nederlandse kooprecht’, Tijdschrift voor Consumenten-
recht 2008, p. 225 and p. 227; T. Hartlief, ‘De klachtplicht van de teleurgestelde koper’, Ars
Aequi 2008-5, pp. 363, 364 and 368.
11 S. Tamboer , ‘De klachtplicht van de koper in het Nederlandse kooprecht’, Tijdschrift voor
Consumentenrecht 2008, pp. 227 and 228.
74 6 – Foreseeable and unforeseeable defects after the transfer of immovable property
2 INVESTIGATION PERIOD AND NOTIFICATION PERIOD
The ‘reasonable period’ within which a buyer is required to notify a seller of
a defect commences at any rate at the point at which a buyer becomes aware
of the nonconformity. Hijma points out that this is not the point at which the
buyer has his first doubts, but the point at which he concludes that the pur-
chased thing does not conform to the contract.12 An example of a situation
in which the buyer’s suspicions hardened into certainty within a few months
can be found in the Fabels v Meenderink judgment.13 The buyer, Meenderink,
had applied for subsidy from the Nibag, the agency chargedwith implement-
ing the Soundproofing Facilities Scheme (Regeling geluidwerende voorzieningen),
for soundproofing his newly-purchased home. TheNibag, however, ruled that
Meenderink did not qualify for subsidy because some of the renovations
previouslymade by the seller, Fabels, did not complywith the soundproofing
standards applicable at the time.Meenderink then turned to the Soundproofing
Facilities Foundation (StichtingGeluidwerendeVoorzieningen) to verifywhether
the Nibag’s refusal to let the house qualify for government subsidywas correct.
The Foundation concurred with the Nibag, after which Meenderink turned
to Fabels. According to Fabels, the period for notifying him commenced at
the point at whichMeenderink was informed of the Nibag’s refusal. According
to the Dutch Supreme Court, however, the applicable criterion was the point
at which Meenderink could or should be assumed to have had sufficient
certainty that the house did not conform to the contract. The Dutch Supreme
Court agreed with the Court of Appeal’s decision that the Nibag’s letter did
not offer sufficient certainty and that the reasonable period did not commence
until the point at which Meenderink received the decision from the Sound-
proofing Facilities Foundation.
Taking into consideration the seller’s interests, it is not unreasonable to
require a buyer to notify a seller that the purchased thing does not conform
to the contract within a reasonable period once the buyer has sufficient certain-
ty of the nonconformity. Aside from this is the issue of how a ‘reasonable
period’ should be interpreted in the case of the purchase of immovable
property.14 When applying article 7:23(1) DCC, the buyer’s problem is that
the sellermight argue that the ‘reasonable period’ commenced before the actual
discovery of the nonconformity, i.e. at the point at which the buyer ought
reasonably to have discovered the defect. This implies that, after having
acquired the property, the buyer is not only required to inform the seller of
any defect he discovers, but also to inspect the property.15
12 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en ruil, 2007, no. 544.
13 Dutch Supreme Court 25 February 2005, JOR 2005, 168 with commentary from J.J. Dam-
mingh (Fabels/Meenderink).
14 See legal ground [3.3.4] of the Pouw v Visser judgment, referred to below.
15 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en ruil, 2007, no. 544a.
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The Pouw vVisser judgment demonstrates how the period of time available
to the buyer to investigate the property (investigation period) can be deter-
mined. It also provides clarity on the length of the period within which the
buyer should notify the seller (notification period).16 Pouw purchased a house
from Visser in Onderdijk on 26 May 2000 which house was built in 1987. This
property was transferred on 1 December 2000. Pouw moved in shortly after-
wards. In late June 2001 (more than six months after the transfer), Pouw
discovered that the paint on the wooden top rail on the window on the western
side of the housewas starting to bubble. The painter called in by Pouw scraped
away the paint and discovered mould and wood rot in the entire rail and
window frame. Pouw then called in a building consultant to ascertain whether
the house had any other defects. The consultant’s report, which summed up
various other defects, was not made available until 26 September 2001. In a
letter dated 27 September 2001, Pouw notified Visser of those defects and
claimed compensation for damage on account of the property’s nonconformity
to the contract. Visser successfully contested this claim before the District Court
and based his defence on article 7:23 DCC. The Court of Appeal upheld this
defence, finding that Pouw had discovered or ought to have discovered the
defects in late June 2001. According to the Court of Appeal, the notification,
which was served twelve weeks later, could not be deemed to have been
served within a reasonable period. The Dutch Supreme Court subsequently
discussed in great detail the length of the investigation period (a) and the
notification period (b) (legal ground 3.3.3):
‘The length of the period referred to at (a) depends on the circumstances of the
case. In view of the seller’s interests protected by article 7:23(1) DCC, the buyer must
institute and carry out the investigation referred to at (a) with the expeditiousness
which could reasonably be expected of him in view of the circumstances of the
case. In that respect, the nature and visibility of the defect, the way in which it
becomes apparent and the buyer’s expertise are some of the relevant factors.’
The Dutch Supreme Court added that if an expert opinion is necessary, the
buyer is in principle entitled to wait for the outcome of that investigation. The
Dutch Supreme Court (legal ground 3.3.4) also found as follows in connection
with the notification period:
‘The third sentence of article 7:23(1) provides that notificationmadewithin a period
of two months of discovery is sufficiently prompt in terms of the length of the
period referred to under (b) in case of a consumer sale.
In case of a non-consumer sale, the question whether notification has been given
within a reasonable periodmust be answered byweighing up all the interests con-
cerned, with due consideration of all the relevant circumstances, includingwhether
16 Dutch Supreme Court 29 June 2007, NJ 2008, 606 with commentary from Jac. Hijma (Pouw
v Visser).
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the seller is prejudiced by the length of the notification period. It is not possible
to give a fixed period for this, even as a point of departure.’
The lower courts sometimes adhere to a notification period of, in principle,
twomonths for the purchase of immovable property (the same as for consumer
sales), but it is clear from the above that the Dutch Supreme Court is not in
favour of such standardisation.17
The buyer must inspect the property after the transfer and must conduct
this inspection reasonably expeditiously. Exactly how expeditiously this should
be done depends on the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and
visibility of the defect, the manner in which it becomes apparent and the
buyer’s expertise. The possible influence of acts or omissions by the seller is
not yet included in this enumeration of relevant circumstances. These elements
are articulated in another judgment: Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II, and the facts
of this case which gave rise to this judgment give every reason for their
inclusion.
This judgment followed on from a judgment delivered by the Dutch
Supreme Court on 23 November 2007 on the liability of the seller of a petrol
station built on a lot which turned out to be contaminated.18 These two judg-
ments were the result of the following dispute: Ploum sold a lot in Kerkrade
containing a petrol station to Smeets and Geelen Tankstations (hereinafter
‘Smeets’). Shortly after the transfer, Smeets discovered that the soil was serious-
ly contaminated and held Ploum liable for the damage it sustained, arguing
that Ploum had breached their contract and committed an unlawful act vis-à-
vis Smeets. Ploum rejected this claim contending, inter alia, that Smeets had
not notified Ploum of the property’s nonconformity (articles 6:89 and 7:23 DCC)
in due time. In its first judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court reiterated its
previous ruling in the Inno v Sluis judgment of 21 April 2006, namely that
articles 7:23 and 6:89 DCC apply to any legal claim by a buyer which is in fact
based on the purchased thing’s nonconformity to the contract, even if the buyer
bases his claim on an unlawful act.19 The Dutch Supreme Court also held
that articles 6:89 and 7:23(1) DCC aimed to protect a debtor in the sense that
the latter should be able to rely on the fact that a creditor who believes that
a performance does not conform to the contract should inform the debtor of
that fact expeditiously. A debtor/seller who becomes aware of a defect in any
other way therefore continues to have an interest in the creditor actually
performing its obligation to notify. In legal proceedings, the buyer is required
17 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en ruil, 2007, no. 545a.
18 Court judgment, 23 November 2007, NJ 2008, 552 with commentary from H.J. Snijders to
Dutch Supreme Court NJ 2008, 553 (Ploum v Smeets & Geelen I) and Dutch Supreme Court
25 March 2011, LJN BP8991 (Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II).
19 Dutch Supreme Court 21 April 2006, NJ 2006, 272 (Inno v Sluis).
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to submit and provide evidence that he notified the seller of the defect in due
time, describing the manner in which he did so.
The Dutch Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court of Appeal
in Arnhem, which was charged with deciding whether Smeets had notified
Ploum in due time. A fewmonths after the transfer it came to Smeets’ attention
that the lot was included in the provincial decontamination programme, it
wrote to BP, the petrol station’s tenant, asking why the property had been
included in that programme. After a number of reminders to BP, Smeets finally
received an answer a year later, the essence of which was that the soil under
the petrol station was seriously contaminated. Smeets immediately notified
Ploum in writing. This particular investigation had therefore taken one year.
The Arnhem Court of Appeal ruled that once it had become aware of the
decontamination programme, Smeets merely needed to conduct a brief invest-
igation by writing to BP enquiring into the reason for inclusion in the pro-
gramme. This was sufficient because, partly on the basis of the statements
made by Ploum, Smeets was entitled to presume that the soil was not con-
taminated. The fact is that the deed of transfer referred to a previous soil
survey and guaranteed that no government agency or public utility had
required the seller tomake any obligatory amendments to the property at that
point.
Ploum lodged a second Supreme Court appeal against this judgment. In
the Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court rejected
the grounds for appeal lodged against the Court of Appeal judgment on the
following ground (legal ground 3.3.2):
‘(...) The more a buyer is entitled to be confident that a purchased thing conforms
to the contract on the basis of the contents of the contract of sale and the other
circumstances of the case, the less he can be expected to proceed with an (ex-
peditious) investigation, because, in general, a buyer may rely on the accuracy of
the statements made by a seller in this connection, certainly if these statements
may be interpreted as reassuring statements regarding the presence or absence
of certain characteristics of the purchased thing.’
The Dutch Supreme Court then went on to comment on the requisite degree
of expeditiousness of the buyer’s obligation to investigate: if it was a simple
matter for the buyer to establish whether a suspected defect actually existed,
that investigation could be brief. If, however, such certainty could only be
obtained after a lengthy or expensive investigation, the buyer would have to
be allowed sufficient time to conduct it. In this regard, the Dutch Supreme
Court held that in determining the requisite degree of expeditiousness, any
third-party assistance required, would also have to be taken into account. The
absence of (prompt) assistance from third parties is not always automatically
the buyer’s responsibility. Finally, the Dutch Supreme Court listed the circum-
stances to be taken into account in protecting the seller’s interests, for which
7:23 DCC was intended:
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‘In this connection (…) the extent to which the seller’s interests have or have not
been prejudiced is the guiding principle. If those interests have not been prejudiced,
there is not likely to be sufficient reason to accuse the buyer of a lack of
expeditiousness. The seriousness of the failures could be such that an omission
by the buyer cannot be used against him.’
In his commentary on the Pouw vVisser judgment, Hartlief carps at the absence
of a firm guideline regarding the various factors which could affect the length
of the investigation period. This is underlined by the fact that articles 6:89 and
7:23 DCC are placed in the key of the principle of legal certainty.20 At first
sight, it would seem that in the Ploum v Smeets &Geelen II judgment, the Dutch
Supreme Court only exacerbated this vagueness by introducing yet another
element into the debate, i.e. ‘all the circumstances’, but on closer consideration
it is clear that this does not involve an open and unstructured weighing-up
of the parties’ interests in which more and more new factors can be added
to the catalogue of circumstances. The debate about the buyer’s obligation to
notify the seller of a defect is a contractual debate on the purchased thing’s
conformity to the contract. As is the case in the formation of a contract of sale,
the buyer’s legitimate expectations and the legal relationship between the
parties, which is subject to good faith, play a key role following the delivery
of the purchased thing as well.
3 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE INFORMATION AND THE OBLIGATION TO
INVESTIGATE UPON THE FORMATION OF A CONTRACT OF SALE
A purchased thing conforms to the contract of sale if it has the characteristics
which the buyer is entitled to expect upon its delivery. These expectations
regarding the purchased thing are largely formed by what the buyer knows
about it. If he has any doubts about the presence of certain characteristics, he
must investigate them. To quote the first sentence of article 7:17(5) DCC, ‘The
buyer may not invoke nonconformity of the thing to the contract if he was,
or reasonably ought to have been, aware of it at the time the contract was
concluded.’ When forming these expectations, the buyer may rely on the
statements made by the seller about the purchased thing (first sentence, article
7:17(2) DCC). But there is more. In forming his expectations, the buyer is also
entitled to expect that the seller will inform him of any defects of which he,
the seller, is aware. This implies that the seller is charged with a certain
obligation to provide information.
Much has been and will continue to be written about the relationship
between the seller’s obligation to provide information and the buyer’s obliga-
20 T. Hartlief, ‘De klachtplicht van de teleurgestelde koper’, Ars Aequi 2008-5, p. 367.
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tion to investigate.21 Current case law would seem to be clear: the seller’s
obligation to provide information prevails over the buyer’s obligation to
investigate. This rule became a standard criterion when the Dutch Supreme
Court addressed the buyer’s right to invoke error. Subsequently, in the Van
Dalfsen v Kampen judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that this principle
can also be used as point of departure in the test against the conformity
requirement of article 7:17 DCC. This judgment, however, emphasised that this
principle is subject to exceptions in certain special circumstances. In its role
as seller of an old building, the municipality of Kampen had breached its
obligation to provide information to the buyer, by failing to give the buyer,
Van Dalfsen, a calculation of the load-bearing capacity, which was still in the
archives of the council’s buildings inspection department. Van Dalfsen, who
wished to convert the old building into a restaurant with a functions room
on the first floor, had however been warned by others that the load-bearing
capacity on the first floor was going to be a problem. Given his plans, he had
also called in an architect with whom he had viewed the building on a number
of occasions. It was furthermore clearly visible that the timber beams on the
first floor were sagging. This fact and the nature and age of the building could
have been reason to conclude that the load-bearing capacity of this floorwould
be inadequate. For this reason, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld the decision
by the Court of Appeal that, despite the fact that themunicipality had breached
its obligation to provide information, it could nevertheless invoke the buyer’s
own obligation to investigate.
Valk has rightly criticised the Dutch Supreme Court’s formulation of this
judgment, which created the impression it was an exception to the main rule
– an exception in which the buyer’s obligation to investigate should suddenly
prevail on account of the special circumstances. He points out that in the
doctrine of nonconformity, as well as in in other doctrines of contract law,
the obligation to provide information goes hand in hand with the principle
that parties to a contract should be protected in their legitimate expectations.22
Within the scope of article 7:17 DCC, the position of the seller’s obligation to
provide information vis-à-vis the buyer’s own obligation to investigate must
21 See inter alia A.G. Castermans, De mededelingsplicht in de onderhandelingsfase, PhD thesis
Leiden, Deventer: Kluwer 1992; J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Wat mogen koper en verkoper van
elkaar verwachten? Digitale en analoge werking van redelijkheid en billijkheid’, WPNR
6304 (1998); P. Klik, ‘De verhouding tussen spreek- en onderzoeksplicht’, NTBR 1998, pp.
295-300, no. 8; J. Dammingh, ‘De mededelingsplicht van de verkoper en de onderzoeksplicht
van de koper’,WPNR 6327 (1998); W.L. Valk, ‘De rol van demededelingsplicht in gevallen
van non-conformiteit’,NTBR 2009-18, pp. 137-144; T.H.M. vanWechem, ‘Gelijkschakeling
van mededelingsplichten en onderzoeksplichten bij vraagstukken van non-conformiteit
en dwaling?’, WPNR 6790 (2009), p. 222-226; Kasper Jansen, ‘De gulden middenweg’, in:
A.G. Castermans, Jac. Hijma, K.J.O. Jansen, P. Memelink, H.J. Snijders & C.J.J.M. Stolker
(eds.), Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, pp. 337-351.
22 W.L. Valk, ‘De rol van de mededelingsplicht in gevallen van non-conformiteit’,NTBR 2009-
18, no. 9.
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always be determined on the basis of the following criterion (of which the
obligation to provide information is ‘merely a corollary’): did the purchased
thing conform to what the buyer was entitled to expect? If the buyer was aware
of a possible defect, as in the Van Dalfsen v Kampen judgment, he cannot insist
that he was entitled to expect the purchased thing not to have this defect. In
such a case the court would not even consider the issue of the seller’s obliga-
tion to provide information. In these circumstances, I doubt even whether the
municipality could have been assumed to have been required to provide the
information in question at all.
4 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE INFORMATION AND THE OBLIGATION TO
INVESTIGATE; FROM A PRE-CONTRACTUAL TO A POST-CONTRACTUAL PER-
SPECTIVE
To what extent can the various theories on the obligation to provide infor-
mation and the obligation to investigate during the formation of a contract
play a part in answering the question whether, after a purchased thing is
delivered, a buyer can be required to inspect a property and, if so, with what
degree of expeditiousness he must conduct this investigation. The point of
departure must be the purchased thing’s nonconformity to the contract, because
otherwise the notification obligation and the obligation to investigate would
not require any consideration. A purchased thing does not conform to a
contract if it does not have the characteristics which the buyer is entitled to
expect on the basis of that contract. Logically, this means that, from the time
of delivery, the buyer is entitled to expect that the purchased thing has the
agreed characteristics. It seems illogical that as of the point at which the buyer
is entitled to have these expectations, he is charged with an obligation to
investigate the existence of any defects. A distinction ought to be made here.
The buyer’s legitimate expectations determine the substance of the contract
and therefore the seller’s contractual obligations. This does not imply that the
buyer should close his eyes to the possibility that the purchased thing does
not conform to the contract and that the seller has defaulted in complyingwith
the contract. If he wishes to exercise his contractual rights vis-à-vis the seller,
the buyermust, from the outset, take account of the possibility that compliance
(or proper compliance) with contracts is not always a given. The inspection
of a newly-acquired thing has since time immemorial been the concern of a
new buyer:23
‘But one by one they started making excuses. The first said, “I have just bought
a field which I need to inspect; I regret I cannot accept the invitation.”. And another
23 Luke 14:18 and 19 (The Holy Bible, revised standard version, Wm. Collins Sons & Co. Ltd,
1971).
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said: “I have bought five yoke of oxen and I go to examine them; I regret I cannot
accept the invitation.”’
In the first instance, a buyer will look at and inspect a property out of a sense
of self-interest, but, when safeguarding his own contractual rights, he will also
have to take into account the other party’s interests. Even when exercising
these rights, the buyer and seller remain locked in a legal relationship which
is governed by good faith andwhich entails that their behaviourmust, in part,
be governed by the other party’s legitimate interests.24 Hijma believes that
this rule forms the basis for the obligation to notify the seller in the case of
nonconformity: the seller has an interest in the fact being established that the
purchased and delivered thing indeed does conform to the contract within
a reasonable period following delivery.25 And that is themore understandable
in case of the sale of immovable property. The passage of time can mean that
minor defects, which would not have amounted to nonconformity upon
transfer, might become major defects which could impede the property’s
normal use in the course of time. The Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment
demonstrates that the seller’s interests play a key role when determining the
investigation period, as in this judgment the Dutch Supreme Court finds that
the question whether the seller’s interests have been prejudiced is a decisive
factor.
What is the relationship between the obligation to provide information
and the obligation to investigate in the post-contractual period – the period
in which the buyer is obliged to notify the seller of any defects? Are these
obligations also an elaboration of the buyer’s legitimate expectations? The Pouw
v Visser judgment makes it clear that it is reasonable to expect a buyer to
conduct the investigation with the expeditiousness which could reasonably
be expected of him in the light of the circumstances of the case. The following
factors are relevant: the nature and visibility of the defect, themanner inwhich
it became apparent and the buyer’s expertise. In the Ploum v Smeets &Geelen II
judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court posed the question whether and how
the buyer should conduct an investigationwithin the framework of his expecta-
tions that the purchased thing complies with the contract (see the legal ground
cited in para. 2). This is a matter of greater or lesser expectations: the more
the buyer is entitled to rely on the property’s conformity, the less quickly he
24 Dutch SupremeCourt 15November 1957,NJ 1958, 67with commentary fromL.E.H.R. (Baris
Riezenkamp).
25 Asser Hijma 5-I, Koop en Ruil, 2007, no. 541; see also Castermans& Krans 2009 (Text and
Commentary on theDutch Civil Code), article 7:23 DCC, note 2, inwhich reference is made
to the ‘pre-contractual’ Baris/Riezenkamp and Booy/Wisman judgements (Dutch Supreme Court
21 January 1966,NJ 1966, 183) also in connectionwith post-contractual obligations to notify
the seller of defects in order to determine the relationship between the buyer’s own obliga-
tion to investigate on the one hand and incorrect information provided by the seller or
the breach of the seller’s obligation to provide information on the other.
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can be expected to conduct an (expeditious) investigation’. This does not mean,
however, that the outcome of this weighing-up cannot yield a ‘digital’ result.26
Once it has been decided what investigation period is reasonable in the given
case, the outcome of a breach of that period will be all or nothing: the loss
of rights and powers based on the property’s nonconformity. As in the pre-
contractual period, the statements made by the seller determine to a large
extent the degree to which expectations are legitimate. As to these statements,
the Dutch Supreme Court finds that the buyer is in general entitled to rely
on their accuracy. As far as the obligation to notify the seller of defects is
concerned, this presents nothing new. After all, article 7:23(1), second sentence
DCC states:
‘Where, however, it is established that the thing lacks a characteristic which accord-
ing to the seller it possessed, or where the variance pertains to facts of which the
seller was or ought to have been aware but has not communicated, the notification
must take place promptly after the discovery.’
There is, however, a notable difference between the Dutch Supreme Court’s
legal ground and the second sentence of article 7:23(1) DCC: according to the
statutory provision, the seller is not under any obligation to investigate the
existence of defects, and therefore no investigation period applies, if the seller
has informed the buyer that the property had a certain characteristic. In that
case, the notification period does not commence until the buyer discovers that
such characteristic is in fact lacking. The Dutch Supreme Court’s ground thus
offers more scope for applying certain qualifications, and that is, in my view,
rightly so. Suppose that when the contract of sale was concluded the seller
informed the buyer that there was no damp in the cellar, but that, three years
after the transfer, when clearing out his tools, the buyer discovers that there
is half a centimetre of water under the linoleum. This explains the rust on his
hammers, saws and drills. A subsequent investigation shows that the damp
was caused because, after the formation of the contract of sale, but twomonths
before the transfer, the drainage authority had decided to permanently raise
the ground water level. Was the buyer exempt from the obligation to invest-
igate the property after the transfer, on account of the seller’s statement before
the formation of the contract? This question about the buyer’s own obligation
to investigate is even more pressing in view of the fact that in article 7:23 DCC
not only the seller’s factual statements seem to rule out the buyer’s own
obligation to investigate, but also any failure to report characteristics of which
the seller was aware (or even unaware), but of which he ought to have been
26 Regarding ‘digital’ and ‘analogue’ patterns in questions on nonconformity, see Kasper
Jansen, ‘De guldenmiddenweg’, in: A.G. Castermans, Jac. Hijma, K.J.O. Jansen, P.Memelink,
H.J. Snijders & C.J.J.M. Stolker (eds.), Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009,
pp. 339-341.
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aware. In my opinion, the information which the buyer should have about
the property increases with the passage of time and, at a certain point, he can
no longer claim that the seller ought to have been aware of a defect while
believing that he should not have been required to discover it himself.
The criticism of the second sentence of article 7:23 DCC is essentially the
same as the criticism of the Van Dalfsen v Kampen judgment: the rule that the
obligation to provide information prevails over the obligation to investigate
is not a main rule to which exceptions are permitted, but merely a rule of
thumb which must be applied within a certain context. But it is important not
to lose sight of the main principle: to what extent was the buyer entitled to
expect that the immovable property had certain characteristics? In the post-
contractual phase, these expectations are in the first place established on the
basis of the substance of the contract (see also the first sentence of legal ground
3.3.2 of the Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment), but, as time passes, these
expectations will be increasingly influenced by the facts of which the buyer
becomes aware in the course of time.27 Not only the statements made by the
seller, but also the factors which the Dutch Supreme Court previously summed
up in the Pouw v Visser judgment (the nature and visibility of the defect, the
manner inwhich it becomes apparent and the buyer’s expertise) can be placed
within the contractual framework sketched in the Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II
judgment: what was the buyer entitled to expect?
5 CONCLUSION
A contract of sale is not a continuing performance contract. This applies to
the sale of immovable property as well. Upon transfer the buyer has paid the
purchase price and the seller has transferred the property. They go their
separate ways, each having performed his part of the contract. However, the
post-contractual period will prove whether the seller has indeed transferred
a property which conforms to the contract, and this applies in particular to
any hidden physical defects whichmanifest themselves after the transfer. The
legal relationship, which is governed by good faith and which commenced
when the parties started negotiating, has not ended. More than that, that
relationship will truly be put to the test in this post-contractual phase if the
property does not entirely satisfy the buyer’s expectations. It is clear from the
Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment that, with regard to the post-contractual
requirements which may be imposed on a buyer, the buyer’s perspective of
the property is decisive. As with the formation of the contract, everything
eventually turns on the questionwhat the buyer was entitled to expect. In this
post-contractual period, these expectations are readjusted by themanifestation
27 Castermans & Krans 2009 (Text and Commentary on the Dutch Civil Code), article 7:23,
note 2.
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of major and minor defects, which require further investigation. There is no
other party that can be chargedwith this responsibility: at this point the buyer
is, after all, the owner of the property. The relationship between the seller’s
obligation to provide information and the buyer’s post-contractual obligation
to investigate, can only be understood in terms of the buyer’s expectations.
Both in the pre-contractual and in the post-contractual phase, the rule that
the obligation to provide information prevails over the obligation to investigate
must be used as a rule of thumb only: a rule which can be a useful aid when
establishing the buyer’s legitimate expectations. Presumably, even more so
than in the pre-contractual phase, the buyer will have to attach greater import-
ance to his own findings and observations.
